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FILLING GAPS IN THE CLOSE CORPORATION
CONTRACT: A TRANSACTION COST
ANALYSIS
Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Viewed contractually, the typical closely held corporation is mostly
gaps. That is, the close corporation contract-the standard form rules
provided by state corporation law as supplemented by a particular corpo-
ration's articles, by-laws, and shareholders' agreements-usually does
not specify how an incorporated, closely held firm and its investors will
substantively adapt to most future contingencies. As a result, these gaps
must be filled ex post, as a need to adapt actually occurs. 1 Normally, gaps
are filled by the shareholders themselves acting by consensus. If consen-
sus is not possible, then the close corporation contract's gap-filling
processes will come into play.
The close corporation contract assigns primary gap-filling authority
to majority shareholders,2 and gives secondary, discretionary gap-filling
authority to courts. If complaining minority shareholders establish that
the majority's conduct is oppressive, violates fiduciary duty, or is incon-
sistent with the minority's reasonable expectations or interests, then
courts will generally grant equitable relief.3 In so doing, it may be said
that the court itself elects to fill a gap in the close corporation contract.
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon. Many thanks to Ian Ayres, Edward Chase, John
Hetherington, Robert Scott, and Robert Thompson for extremely helpful comments on earlier ver-
sions of this Article. This research was supported by a faculty fellowship provided by the law firm of
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland, Oregon.
1 Gap-filling problems are endemic to all relational contracts. For helpful analysis, see E. AL-
LAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.15-7.17 (2d ed. 1990); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261 (1985) [hereinafter Goetz &
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice]; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. RaV. 1089 (1981).
2 For example, the majority may discharge a minority shareholder from the corporation's em-
ploy. The majority also may establish or continue policies concerning payment of dividends, re-
demption of shares, or compensation of shareholder-employees that displease a minority
shareholder. Additionally, the majority may dissolve the corporation or merge it into a corporation
from which the minority is excluded.
3 See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations,
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).
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However, litigation is costly and minority shareholders cannot be certain
that they will prevail. Thus, the close corporation contract, as currently
interpreted by most courts, leaves substantial room for majority share-
holders to favor their own interests and ignore minority shareholders'
concerns.
Academics are sharply divided concerning the fairness and effi-
ciency of close corporation law's majority-favoring gap-filling rules.
Much of the debate has centered on the implications of the partnership
analogy and the "would have wanted" gap-filling theory. Under one
prominent view, lawmakers should resolve or prevent postharmony4 dis-
putes in close corporations by referring to partnership law. This view
has been most thoroughly developed by John Hetherington and Michael
Dooley.5 They argue that closely held corporations and partnerships are
functionally equivalent entities having similar organizational needs6 and
that partnership law provides better governance rules for such closely
held firms than does corporation law.7 Hetherington and Dooley appar-
ently believe that if bargaining impediments did not exist, minority inves-
tors would always insist on partnership form or partnership-like liquidity
rules." Accordingly, they propose that such rules be provided to close
corporations via an immutable statutory rule requiring closely held cor-
porations to redeem the shares of dissatisfied shareholders at the latter's
option.9
Other commentators argue that applying partnership law to close
corporations would be inefficient and inconsistent with the "would have
wanted" gap-filling theory. This view has been propounded most force-
fully by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in their recent book 0 and
in an earlier article.11 Easterbrook and Fischel assert that, in filling gaps
4 A closely held corporation is in its postharmony phase when the shareholders can no longer
govern their relation by consensus.
5 John A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation.: A Proposed Statu-
tory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1 (1977).
6 Id. at 6, 50-59.
7 Hetherington and Dooley identify investment illiquidity as the root cause of postharmony
exploitation, and contrast the plight of minority shareholders with the more favorable situation of
minority partners. Id. at 3-4. They note that the dissolution provisions of partnership law give each
partner the power to force a liquidation of the firm. Id. at 3. Liquidation, in turn, creates a market
for the minority partner's interest so long as other partners or outsiders are willing to buy the part-
nership's assets.
8 Id. at 38. In Hetherington and Dooley's view, minority shareholders typically have limited
knowledge and foresight concerning the risks of corporate form, tend to be excessively trusting of the
majority, and are unwilling to raise questions at the outset of the venture that might demonstrate
lack of confidence in the majority. Id. at 36-38.
9 Id. at 2-6.
10 FRANK H. EASTER13ROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIc STRucTuRE oF CoRPo-
RATE LAW 228-52 (1991).
11 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 271 (1986).
87:216 (1992)
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within the close corporation contract, courts must decide what the par-
ties "would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and
been able to transact costlessly in advance." 12 According to Easterbrook
and Fischel, absent transaction costs, rational majority shareholders
would not always bargain for partnership-like rules. 13 Thus, courts
should not seek guidance in their gap-filling efforts by analogizing close
corporations to partnerships. 14
I believe that proponents of each view are partially correct. Some
investors who choose unmodified close corporation form would adopt
modifications, sometimes modeled on partnership law, but for bargaining
impediments. On the other hand, some investors in closely held firms do
rationally choose and prefer unmodified corporate form. Needed, then,
is a more refined theory of rational form selection and efficiency-minded
judging15 that better explains the relationship between partnership and
corporation law and how courts should identify and fill gaps in the close
corporation contract.
This Article develops a more refined transaction-cost based theory
which explains: why rational investors in jointly owned, closely held
firms initially choose corporate form; why they leave the contractual
gaps that they do; and how efficiency-minded judges should respond to
postharmony disputes made possible by the form chosen and the gaps
left. My theory takes into account not only the possibility that investors
should have chosen partnership law, but also the advantages and disad-
vantages of organizing production as an implicit team, via long-term con-
tracts between separate businesses or as a sole proprietorship. In
explicating this theory of form choice, the Article initially assumes that
investors are fully rational. Later, I relax that assumption and consider
how courts should respond to situations in which rational investors
would not have selected corporate form.
Central to my theory is an understanding of the dichotomy between
opportunism and adaptability. This Article shows that rational individu-
als choose to operate as a firm in response to a governance problem en-
demic to team production supported by team-specific investment-the
12 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 34.
13 Instead, majority investors might insist on corporate form out of rational fear that minority
shareholders would use unconditional withdrawal rights opportunistically to leverage unfair advan-
tages. Id. at 241-42.
14 Proponents of the "would have wanted" gap-flling theory do not agree how courts should fill
gaps in specific cases. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that courts should look to the contractual
solutions commonly adopted by shareholders who do not leave a gap in their corporate contract.
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that such actual contracts offer the best evidence of what the litigants
would have done if they had bargained over the matter in dispute. Id. at 249-52. For other views,
see authorities cited supra note I.
15 "Efficiency-minded judges" are judges who make their decisions based on efficiency considera-
tions. The first similar published usage of the modifier "efficiency-minded" of which I am aware
occurs in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 94-95.
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need to maximize individual and collective ability to adapt to changed
circumstances, and at the same time, to minimize the ability of team
members to obtain more than their fair share of team-specific value
through opportunistic use of available adaptive mechanisms. Rational
individuals, then, choose a governance structure for their firm that pro-
vides the optimal mix of adaptability and protection from opportunism.
Individual adaptability is maximized by rules allowing each owner
to withdraw her capital at will. Collective adaptability is maximized by a
governance structure that determines all adaptations, including the indi-
vidual's right to withdraw capital, by majority rule. As individual adapt-
ability is enhanced, so is the risk of minority opportunism. Conversely,
as majority adaptability is increased, so is the risk of majority opportu-
nism. Drawing on the dichotomy between opportunism and adaptabil-
ity, the Article explains in detail: (1) when joint ownership is more
desirable than a sole proprietorship; (2) why partnership form is optimal
for jointly owned, closely held firms where fear of majority opportunism
imposes greater ex ante costs than fear of minority opportunism; and (3)
why corporate form is optimal when fear of minority opportunism
predominates.
The Article builds on this theory of rational form selection to ex-
plain the gap-filling role of efficiency-minded courts. In so doing, I hope
to shed light on the so-called contract analogy16 and the "would have
wanted" gap-filling theory.17 I argue that an efficiency-minded court's
16 The view that corporations can meaningfully be analogized to contracts is central to the work
of many scholars and has sparked substantial commentary. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 10, at 1-39; Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. 99 (1989); John J. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of
the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919 (1988); Charles R.
O'Kelley, Jr., Opting In and Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures: Refining the So-
Called Coasean Contract Theory, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 353 (1992); Robert B. Thompson, The Law's
Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377 (1990). See also Symposium, Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
17 The "would have wanted" theory is often criticized as indeterminate. Critics point with de-
light to Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) in which Judges Easterbrook and
Posner, two leading proponents of the "would have wanted" theory, reached diametrically opposed
gap-filling results. Indeed, not only do Hetherington and Dooley reach different conclusions than
Easterbrook and Fischel, they also appear to be engaged in a search for the result that parties would
have wanted if bargaining were costless. That formula is not explicitly used in their 1977 article, but
is implicit in their explanation of why investors seek unmodified corporate form. See supra note 5, at
2-6.
More recently, Hetherington has explicitly acknowledged the primacy of this search:
Bargaining is costly, and the parties may be expected to engage in it only when the prospective
benefits exceed the costs. In resolving disputes ex post, the efficiency and productivity of ex-
change transactions would be enhanced if the courts sought the allocation which the parties
would have made ex ante had they then considered that the gains of bargaining exceeded the
costs.
John A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities,
22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 9, 20 (1987).
87:216 (1992)
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goal should be to assist investors in achieving an optimal ex ante balance
between adaptability and opportunism. However, in pursuing this goal,
the court must avoid a gap-filling approach that undermines the value-
maximizing reasons that prompted shareholders to choose corporate
form. Thus, the court must fashion a gap-filling rule that recognizes
the relative concern for minority and majority opportunism indicated by
both the form chosen and by the team members' investment
characteristics.
II. A TRANSACTION COST EXPLANATION OF RATIONAL FORM
SELECTION
A. Introductory Note
Rational individuals invest their human and money capital with a
view to maximizing the value of such resources.' 8 Thus, if rational indi-
viduals choose to become shareholder-employees of a closely held corpo-
ration, they do so in the rational belief that such choice will maximize the
value of their human and money capital. This Part provides a transac-
tion cost explanation1 9 of when and why rational investors would so be-
lieve. In this Part, I ignore the distorting effect of tax and liability
limitation rules and focus solely on the internal governance needs in-
volved in form selection. These distorting effects are factored in later.20
The form selection theory is explicated by considering the organiza-
18 A rational investor engages in an ongoing comparative search for the investment or invest-
ments that promise the most attractive return on invested capital given the investor's taste for risk.
See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESS AS-
SOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-6 (1992); O'Kelley, supra note 16, at 354-55.
19 Recognition of the importance of transaction costs is generally traced to Ronald H. Coase and
his two seminal works: The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's insights have been recognized and extended in recent years
in a variety of forums.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, whose recent book continues their contribution to
Coasean scholarship, dedicate that book to Coase: "In particular, we like all other contemporary
scholars in corporate organization owe a great debt to R. H. Coase, who first pointed out the similar-
ity (and differences) between corporations and markets .... Without him the economic study of
corporate law might lie ahead; to him we have dedicated this book." EASTEREROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 10, at viii.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and influential contribution to transaction-cost-economics
scholarship is that of Oliver Williamson. See particularly OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (dedicated
to, among others, R. H. Coase). In turn, Williamson has been greatly influenced by the seminal
works of Ian MacNeil concerning relational contract theory. See Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjust-
ment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter MacNeil, Contracts]; Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures
of Contract 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974).
For other contributions to our understanding of Coase's insights, see Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organiration, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777 (1972); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983).
20 See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.2(b), and IV.C.2(c).
220
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tional needs of two rational individuals-Suzanne and Emily-who have
decided to join forces in a brewery venture. Suzanne, currently a sales
representative for a national brewery, will be in charge of marketing and
sales. Emily, now the head brewmistress at another brewery, will be re-
sponsible for beer production. Each will also make a money capital
investment.
I will assume that at the outset of their venture Suzanne and Emily
share two expectations: (1) that each of them will use her best efforts to
make the venture successful; and (2) that profits will be divided accord-
ing to each participant's relative contribution. To maximize the
probability that these expectations will be fulfilled, Suzanne and Emily
could structure their relationship as an implicit team, via a long-term
contract, as a sole proprietorship, as a partnership, or as a corporation.
The question, then, is which organizational structure promises to maxi-
mize the value of each investor's human and money capital.21
B. Transaction Cost Factors
In recent years, transaction cost economists have identified the be-
havioral and economic factors that explain why particular transactions
are most efficiently organized in a particular way.2 2 Academics in both
law and economics are still working out the implications of this research.
This Article applies the central transaction cost factors-bounded ration-
ality, opportunism, and team-specific investment-in developing a theory
of rational form selection.23 For those unfamiliar with transaction-cost-
economics terminology, a brief exegesis follows.
1. Bounded Rationality.-While individuals may intend to act ra-
tionally, there are cognitive limits, or bounds, on their ability to do so.
Even if all relevant information is available, there are often too many
variables to be considered. Understanding the limits on human rational-
ity sheds light on the extent to which ex ante planning promises an effi-
cient solution to future adaptive needs.24
21 This Part involves a transaction cost analysis of team production in the closely held setting of
the type suggested by Oliver Williamson:
[O]rthodoxy holds that the allocation of economic activity as between firms and markets is a
datum .... Transaction cost economics approaches the study of economic organization very
differently. Thus firms, markets, and mixed modes are regarded as alternative means of organi-
zation, the allocation of economic activity among which is a decision variable. Firms, more-
over, are described as governance structures, the internal organization of which has real
economic consequences. An assessment of the contracting process runs the gamut from faceless
transactions of the kind that are adequately serviced by auctioneers to complex bilateral trades
in which the identity of the parties matters critically.
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance Framework and Implications, 140 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 195, 195 (1984).
22 See supra note 19.
23 For a comprehensive account and analysis of the interplay between and among these transac-
tion cost factors, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 19, at 15-84.
24 "[Blounded rationality recognizes that the problems with which human actors are attempting
87:216 (1992)
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2. Opportunism.-Economists assume that individuals will pursue
their own self-interest in economic matters. However, there are two cate-
gories of self-interest seeking. First, in simple, or open, self-interest seek-
ing, economic actors prefer their own interests to those of other
economic actors, but do so while being honest and above board in their
dealings. Second, opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile. Indi-
viduals who act opportunistically seek to further their own ends by tak-
ing advantage of the information deficits of those with whom they deal.
Opportunistic actors seek to extract an advantage which would be denied
them if the party with whom they deal had full information. As Oliver
Williamson puts it, "opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted
disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, dis-
tort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse." 25
3. Team-Specific Investment.-In pursuing their brewery venture,
Suzanne and Emily may be described as a team, and their collective ac-
tivities in making and selling beer may be described as team production.
When an asset has a higher value in its current team use than in its next
best use, the asset is said to have team-specific value-value that cannot
be realized by putting the asset to another use.26
Suppose, for example, that Suzanne owns and operates a generic
beer distributing business, and that Emily owns and operates a generic
beer brewery. Suzanne buys generic beer for resale to grocery stores.
She currently buys from Emily, but there are other brewers who would
supply generic beer on similar terms. Likewise, Emily currently sells her
product to Suzanne, but there are other distributors who would purchase
her output on similar terms. If Suzanne and Emily stopped dealing with
each other, thereby terminating their team, neither would experience any
loss in the value of her human or money capital. Both Suzanne and Em-
ily could earn the same return by dealing with others. Accordingly,
neither Suzanne's nor Emily's investments are team-specific.
On the other hand, suppose that Suzanne is in the business of dis-
tributing only the special beer that Emily produces, and that there are no
other suppliers who will give her an equivalent product on similar terms.
to cope are very complicated in relation to their cognitive abilities." Williamson, supra note 21, at
198.
25 Id. at 47.
26 This insight belongs to both Williamson and Alchian. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Wood-
ward in their excellent review-essay, The Finn is Dead; Long Live the Finm A Review of Oliver
Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LrrERATuRE 65 (1988) (book
review), put it this way:
If a resource can leave a team without cost or loss of its value, Williamson would say it is
independent or is not team-specific, or is "redeployable." But if the remaining resources would
lose by its departure, they are dependent (reliant is the term in legal proceedings) on it, and to
them, the departing resource is unique because they cannot replace it with no loss. Resources
that are mutually dependent are also mutually unique, and vice versa.
Id. at 68.
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Further, suppose that Emily only distributes her beer through Suzanne,
and that there are no replacement distributors who would purchase the
same volume or pay the same price as Suzanne. Under these circum-
stances, if Suzanne and Emily stopped dealing with each other, thereby
terminating their team, each would experience a loss in the value of her
human or money capital. Thus, Suzanne's and Emily's investments
would be described as having team-specific value and as being mutually
dependent. 27
C. Organizing Production as an Implicit Team
If Suzanne and Emily need not make team-specific investments in
order to carry out the brewery venture, then they can efficiently organize
production as an implicit team.28 Each can own a separate business-
Suzanne's distributorship and Emily's brewery-and production can be
carried out by Suzanne executing purchase orders for beer as she sees fit.
Suzanne need not worry that Emily will opportunistically dilute the qual-
ity of her product or raise prices arbitrarily. Rather than submit to such
price increases or continue buying beer from Emily after customer com-
plaints, Suzanne could simply withdraw from her relationship with Em-
ily and purchase adequate replacement beer from other suppliers.
Suzanne's ability to costlessly withdraw from the team will likely prevent
Emily from acting opportunistically. By the same token, Emily need not
fear that Suzanne will arbitrarily demand a lower price for the beer she
purchases from Emily, or that Suzanne will be lazy in her sales efforts,
because Emily can find other equally acceptable outlets for her product.
On the other hand, the greater the team-specific investment made by
Suzanne or Emily, the less satisfactory organizing as an implicit team
will be. The existence of team-specific investment and the information
asymmetries inherent in separate ownership and control combine to
make opportunism possible. Opportunism arises principally because of
the right of each team member to withdraw her capital without legal
penalty. While such a right ensures that each team member will be able
to adapt to changed circumstances, it also makes possible opportunistic
threats of withdrawal.
For example, at some future date, Suzanne might opportunistically
claim that factors beyond her control, such as competitive pressures,
make it impossible for her to continue buying beer from Emily at the
current price. She may threaten to switch suppliers and offer to continue
buying beer from Emily only if she agrees to reduce her prices. Emily
may not be able to ascertain whether Suzanne is acting opportunistically.
27 Id.
28 There is a burgeoning body of literature on implicit contracts, which seems almost a contra-
diction in terms to lawyers. For a complete bibliography through 1985, see Sherwin Rosen, Implicit
Contracts A Survey, 23 J. ECON. LrrERATIJRE 1144 (1985).
87:216 (1992)
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However, as long as the offered price is greater than Emily can obtain by
switching distributors and at least enough to cover costs, Emily may re-
luctantly accede to Suzanne's demands and hope that Suzanne is both
telling the truth and that her marketing situation will subsequently im-
prove. As a result of Suzanne's opportunism, she will capture much of
the team-specific value attributable to Emily's investment.29
Of course, Emily can also opportunistically claim that changed cir-
cumstances-perhaps the alleged availability of a new distribution net-
work-require either a price change in her favor or a switch to a new
distributor who will pay more. As long as the demanded price leaves
Suzanne with more profit than she would obtain by changing beer suppli-
ers, she might agree to the price hike and thereby shift a greater portion
of the implicit team's value to Emily.
Even the risk of nonopportunistic withdrawal may lessen the attrac-
tiveness of organizing as an implicit team. For example, suppose that ten
years after Suzanne begins selling Emily's beer, Emily correctly con-
cludes that she will maximize the value of her investments by entering
into an implicit and exclusive relationship with a new distributor-Sam.
Suzanne will be required to shift her capital to other less valuable uses,
and Emily will be under no legal obligation to compensate Suzanne for
the capital loss occasioned by Emily's investment decision. It is impor-
tant to note that Emily is not acting opportunistically in actually with-
drawing. By operating as an implicit team, each team member has
assumed the risk of loss from future contingencies that make it profitable
for one party to withdraw from the team. Nonetheless, from an ex ante
point of view, this all-or-nothing allocation of risk may be less than ideal
for prospective investors who cannot diversify against such risks.
D. Long-Term Contracting
For individuals contemplating team-specific investment, operation
as an implicit team may pose unacceptable opportunistic and nonoppor-
tunistic risks. These risks are made possible because any member may
withdraw her capital from an implicit team without fear of legal penalty.
One response to this problem is for team members to create an explicit
team by negotiating and executing a long-term contract which specifies
their rights and duties with respect to some or all contingencies. The
availability of legal remedies should either party breach the contract may
lessen the threat of opportunistic withdrawal and provide some sharing
of the expected losses from nonopportunistic withdrawal. 30 On the
29 This example draws on the discussion of appropriable quasi-rents in Benjamin Klein, et aL,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW &
ECON. 297 (1978).
30 Suppose that after commencement of the brewery venture, Sharon finds that her capital will
have a higher value if redeployed in a new venture from which Jake will be excluded. If the venture
is organized as an implicit team, then Sharon may simply withdraw and capture all of the gain from
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 224 1992-1993
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other hand, while contractual specification of rights and duties may pro-
vide protection against opportunistic withdrawal, the parties may also
incur significant costs from lost flexibility.31 Thus, the utility of long-
term contracting and the appropriate contracting strategy depend on the
team's relative needs for adaptability and protection from opportunism.
Suppose, for example, that Suzanne and Emily attempt to negotiate
a fully contingent long-term contract. They agree that Emily will pro-
vide 100,000 cases of beer annually for ten years at $3 per case, with an
automatic cost-of-living adjustment every two years. Compared to oper-
ation as an implicit team, this fully contingent contract will significantly
deter opportunistic threats of withdrawal. For instance, one year later
Emily might demand a price increase, opportunistically claiming that she
can now sell her beer at a much higher price and in much greater volume
if she deals with other distributors. The availability of damages or other
legal remedies will enable Suzanne to negotiate from a much stronger
position than if Emily could withdraw from the team without legal pen-
alty. Indeed, Suzanne may choose to simply refuse to renegotiate, secure
in the knowledge that damages will be available if Emily breaches.
Suppose, however, that Emily's request is not opportunistic, that Su-
zanne refuses to renegotiate, and that the threat of legal penalty forces
Emily to honor the contract, although it is no longer profitable.32 If we
assume that Suzanne and Emily intended the cost-of-living escalator
clause to accurately cover Emily's future cost increases, then Emily's ex
post loss results from the parties' contractual misspecification of how to
adapt to changed circumstances. 33 Further, from an ex ante perspective
we can assume that Suzanne and Emily realized that, despite their best
efforts, their contract might contain terms that would later prove mal-
adaptive. Accordingly, we can assume that, to the extent Suzanne and
the changed circumstances that have made her capital more valuable in another use, and at the same
time avoid bearing any of the loss in the value of Jake's capital caused by Sharon's withdrawal. If
the venture is organized via a long-term contract, Sharon may withdraw but she will be required to
compensate Jake for his contractual expectations. The obligation to pay damages could be viewed,
then, as requiring Sharon to share with Jake the risk of loss resulting from subsequent nonoppor-
tunistic withdrawal by either of them. If, after fully compensating Jake, Sharon would still find it
profitable to breach the contract, then such breach would be efficient. On risk sharing through
contract, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL
STuD. 427 (1983). On the utility of efficient breach analysis, see Richard Craswell, Contract Reme-
dies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); Daniel Fried-
mann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an En-
forcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. Rv. 554 (1977); Ian R. MacNeil,
Efficient Breach of Contract Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. Rav. 947 (1982).
31 On the inherent conflict between the need for specificity and the need for flexibility, see Mac-
Neil, Contracts, supra note 19.
32 In this circumstance breach would not be efficient. See supra note 30.
33 For an excellent analysis of such "formulation errors," see Goetz & Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice, supra note 1.
87:216 (1992)
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Emily were risk averse and unable to diversify against the risk of loss
from misspecification, each of them would have discounted the value of
their prospective investment to reflect such risk.34
The implications of this line of analysis may be summarized as fol-
lows. Prospective venturers may eliminate the risk of loss from mis-
specification by operating as an implicit team, but this exposes team
members to the risk of loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw from
the team. Alternatively, prospective venturers may reduce the risk of
loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw from the team by attempting
to negotiate a fully contingent long-term contract, but this exposes team
members to a risk of loss from misspecification. Thus, rational investors
will organize as an implicit team only if, viewed ex ante, the risk of loss
from misspecification inherent in long-term contracting imposes a higher
cost than the risk of loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw from the
team.
An alternative to a fully contingent long-term contract is a contract
that does not attempt to provide an answer to all contingencies at the
time the relation begins, but instead provides a mechanism whereby such
contingencies may be addressed in the future. For example, a long-term
contract might provide that price or other terms will be arbitrated or
renegotiated in good faith at either party's request. Such cooperative-
adjustment devices signal to an efficiency-minded arbiter or court that
the parties intended to minimize the risk of loss from misspecification. 35
In comparison to a fully contingent contract, a contract with coop-
erative-adjustment clauses exposes the parties to a greater risk of loss
from opportunistic requests for renegotiation, but to a lesser risk of loss
from misspecification. However, in comparison to operation as an im-
plicit team, a contract with cooperative-adjustment clauses exposes par-
ties to a greater risk of opportunistic refusal to renegotiate (since gap-
filling mechanisms do not costlessly or inevitably produce changed
terms), but to a lesser risk of loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw
(since neither party can simply withdraw without risk of legal penalty).36
E. Organization as a Firm
1. Introductory Note.-Implicit teams and teams organized via
long-term contracts present a variety of responses to the opportunism/
34 The reduction in value would be a type of "error cost" causing some affected individuals to
simply forego a prospective venture. Others will invest but later bear the cost from "unintended
resort to state interpretations of disputed contracts." Id. at 265.
35 For examples and discussion of cooperative-adjustment clauses typically found in long-term
contracts, see Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv.
2005, 2020-21 (1987). See also WiLLsAmsoN, supra note 19, at 178 (discussing role of specialized
governance structures in promoting harmonious adaptation to changed circumstances).
36 For a discussion of the advantages and limits of legal enforcement of cooperative adjustment
clauses, see Scott, supra note 35, at 2042-46.
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 1992-1993
The Close Corporation Contract
adaptability dichotomy. However, such teams are similar in one critical
respect: Team members each retain legally separate ownership and con-
trol of a portion of the team's business assets. For example, whether
organized as an implicit team or through long-term contracts, Emily will
own or control the assets used in brewing beer and Suzanne will own or
control the assets used in her distributorship. Because of this separate
ownership, either Emily or Suzanne can make a credible threat to with-
draw both her human and other capital from the team.37
The firm differs from both the implicit team and the long-term con-
tract in that members of teams organized as a firm do not separately own
identifiable parts of the team's business. This unification of ownership
lessens the risk that one team member will threaten to withdraw from the
team and take with her a portion of the team's business assets.38 How-
ever, operation as a firm creates a need for governance rules to determine
how control over the unified firm's assets will be allocated, and how the
rights of individual team members will be balanced against the collective
rights of the firm. These needs are usually satisfied by choosing to oper-
ate the firm as either a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or closely
held corporation. The remainder of this subpart examines the govern-
ance reasons that motivate rational investors to select one or the other of
these forms.
2. Organization as a Sole Proprietorship.-The simplest alternative
to organization via implicit or explicit contracts between autonomous
team members is a sole proprietorship. In a sole proprietorship one indi-
vidual, the proprietor, owns and controls all of the physical capital
needed to carry out team production and provide services to the firm.
Under common-law rules, the sole proprietorship is created by the mu-
tual assent of proprietor and agent, and either party may terminate the
relationship at will. During this relationship, agency law imposes on the
agent both a general fiduciary duty of loyalty to the proprietor and an
obligation to obey the proprietor's commands concerning the agent's per-
formance of her assigned tasks. No corresponding duty is imposed on
the proprietor.39
The proprietor's right to control the agent's performance or to dis-
charge her from the team's employ at will means that the proprietor is
able to adapt to changed circumstances nearly as readily as if the team
were organized as an implicit team.40 Thus, a proprietorship governed
37 To make a credible threat of withdrawal from an implicit team, a team member must oppor-
tunistically allege plausible but untrue facts supporting the need for either changed terms or with-
drawal from the team. To make a credible threat of withdrawal from a long-term contract, a team
member must additionally make a plausible allegation that the gains from withdrawal will exceed the
damages which would flow from breach if no agreement can be reached.
38 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 19, at 78.
39 See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 12-41.
40 The proprietor's discretion may be limited by the obligation of good faith and fair dealing said
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only by common-law rules is not subject to the misspecification costs that
attend organization via long-term contract.41 Additionally, because all
team-specific physical capital is owned or controlled by the proprietor
and because the agent is constrained by fiduciary duties, the proprietor is
subject to much less risk that the agent will opportunistically threaten to
withdraw from the team than would be the case in an implicit team.
However, operation as a sole proprietorship may expose the agent to a
greater risk of opportunism than would organization via implicit or ex-
plicit contracts between autonomous producers.
Suppose, for example, that Suzanne and Emily organize their brew-
ery venture with Emily as proprietor and Suzanne as agent. Emily owns
or leases all of the buildings, machinery, equipment, furnishings, and
other physical capital needed by the venture and spends most of her time
supervising the brewery operations. Suzanne serves as a salaried, at-will
employee and is responsible for sales. At some later date, Suzanne de-
mands a substantial salary increase claiming that her contributions are
not being fairly rewarded and that she will start a competitor firm if her
demands are not met. As a sole proprietor, Emily is in a much stronger
position to resist a demand that she suspects is opportunistic than she
would be if the venture was organized as an implicit or explicit team
between autonomous producers. Suzanne cannot take with her any por-
tion of the team's physical capital. Additionally, fiduciary duty will pre-
vent Suzanne from competing with Emily's proprietorship until after she
has left Emily's employ. 42
On the other hand, suppose that after a network of distributors is
established, Emily informs Suzanne that production cost increases will
make it necessary to either cut Suzanne's salary by forty percent or dis-
charge her from the firm. Emily's actions may be an objectively justified
response to changed circumstances or they may be an opportunistic at-
tempt to steal most of the current or sunk value of Suzanne's team-spe-
cific human capital value.43 In either case, Suzanne will likely accede to
the salary cut if her human capital has less value in an alternative use,
particularly if she believes that Emily is not being opportunistic.
3. Choice of Joint Ownership Instead of Sole Proprietorship.-A
sole proprietorship will typically be chosen as the team's organizational
form when one team member, the owner, has substantially more team-
to exist in all contracts. Additionally, the proprietor may not discharge an employee when such
discharge would violate public policy. For an excellent discussion of these limitations on the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). See also
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 947 (1984); Mayer G.
Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY
L.J. 1097 (1989).
41 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
42 See, eg., Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1963).
43 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 97-98.
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specific capital at risk than other team members and therefore has the
most to gain or lose from the success or failure of the team.44 Residual
claimant status motivates the owner to use her best efforts on behalf of
the firm in her role as team monitor. In this role, she directs team mem-
bers' actions, measures and compensates team members for their margi-
nal productivity, and hires and fires team members as necessary. The
proprietor's unilateral management power allows quick adaptation to
changed circumstances, but exposes lesser team members to opportunis-
tic action by the residual claimant. If the team-specific investment by the
residual claimant is substantial and that of other team members relatively
small, then the sole proprietor will generally have more to gain by mak-
ing objectively justifiable adaptations that increase the long-term value of
her residual claim, than by seeking short-term gain through "theft" of a
portion of lesser team members' capital.45 However, as the team-specific
investment by team members increases, it both becomes excessively
costly for one of them to efficiently monitor the team, and the risk of
opportunism by a sole monitor becomes too great for other team mem-
bers to comfortably bear.46
Joint ownership of a closely held firm typically arises, then, when
team-specific skills and investment are distributed somewhat equally
among team members. In such circumstances, mutual self-monitoring is
more efficient than having one member attempt to learn enough to moni-
tor other members.4 7
Whether organized as a general partnership or a closely held corpo-
ration, joint owners are constrained to some extent by fiduciary duties.
As a result, joint ownership lessens the risk of opportunistic use of own-
ership rights that is ever present in a sole proprietorship.
Joint ownership also responds to the risk of opportunistic with-
drawal threats that is always present in teams organized outside of a firm
via either implicit or long-term contracts. Inherently, joint ownership
ensures greater sharing of information about the parties' individual and
collective needs. Joint ownership also makes it more difficult to untangle
the physical capital contributions of the parties than would be the case if
each party maintained separate ownership and control over discrete parts
of the joint endeavor's physical capital. For both of these reasons, it be-
comes more difficult for a team member to maintain a credible threat of
44 A sole proprietorship involving mutual, team-specific investment is characterized by coopera-
tive specialization by labor inputs (team members), one of whom serves as team monitor and is the
firm's residual claimant. See Armen A. Alchian, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, 140 J.
INSTrrrTONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 35-36 (discussing the nature of a team).
45 The obvious risk in seeking short-term gain through opportunism disguised as needed adapta-
tion is that, if found out, the other team members may retaliate, resulting in an overall loss in value
to the residual claimant.
46 See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 10, at 97-98.
47 On the importance of knowledge acquisition costs in explaining choice of organizational form,
see Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 141 (1988).
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withdrawal based on unfounded adaptive needs. Nonetheless, though
muted, the threat of opportunism will still exist to the extent joint owners
retain withdrawal rights or are granted fiduciary protection under the
relationship's governing rules.
III. A THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP FORM
A. Partnership Law's Statutory Governance Rule and the Archetypical
General Partnership
Jointly owned firms range in complexity from a simple two-owner
firm with relatively small team-specific value, to publicly held firms with
thousands of investors and an enormous amount of team-specific capi-
tal.4 The statutory governance rules of general partnership law can be
best understood as ideally suited for jointly owned, closely held firms that
are close to the margin where organization through simple contracts or
within a sole proprietorship would be equally efficient. 49 As jointly
owned firms move further away from the margin between organization
via contract or sole proprietorship, and closer toward the publicly held
firm, the partnership law governance rules become less optimal.
In an archetypical general partnership that is functionally near the
margin where organization via contract or sole proprietorship would be
equally efficient, each joint owner will expect to make similar team-spe-
cific human capital contributions. These rational investors do not seek a
fixed specification of rights and duties because they anticipate a general
need to adapt to future contingencies. On the other hand, they wish to
see their adaptive rights constrained in a way that will optimally reduce
the risk of opportunism. Consistent with these expectations, partnership
law default rules provide that each partner will share equally in profits
and losses,50 and have equal rights in management and conduct of the
partnership's business.51 This initial assignment of rights recognizes the
48 For a discussion of organizational form in terms of a spectrum or continuum ranging from
simple market transactions to complex hierarchical organizations, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 19,
at 83-84.
49 A partnership may be created without a written agreement and without any partner having
actually intended to adopt partnership form. All that is required is that two or more individuals
agree, implicitly or explicitly, to carry on as co-owners a business for a profit. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969). Presumably, partnership law provides a governance structure that is
optimal for simple business associations formed with relatively little ex ante planning. The trigger
point chosen for identifying teams that will be required, unless otherwise agreed, to use the partner-
ship structure-the investors' decision to associate as co-owners in the conduct of a business for
profit-is consistent with the analysis to this point. Crossing over from market or contractual organ-
ization of team production carries with it certain needs to adapt and concerns about opportunism.
The interests of society, as well as efficiency-minded investors, are served by providing a satisfactory
off-the-rack governance structure for these firms that might otherwise make team-specific investment
as joint owners without creating an adequate governance structure.
50 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
51 Id. § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
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typical partners' assumed expectation of equal contribution. Addition-
ally, status quo-protecting decisionmaking rules provide significant pro-
tection against opportunism. For example, major changes in the team's
rules, such as modification of a partner's profit sharing, decisionmaking,
or participation rights, cannot be made within the existing partnership
except by unanimous consent of all partners.5 2 In addition, new partners
cannot be admitted without unanimous consent.5 3 However, the initial
assignment of rights and the constraints on less-than-unanimous action
are partially counterbalanced by the ability of any dissatisfied partner, or
group of partners, to unilaterally dissolve the partnership. 54
The at-will dissolution mechanism protects both individual and col-
lective adaptive needs. For example, if because of changed circum-
stances, a partner's capital will have a higher value when invested in
some other endeavor, she may simply dissolve the old partnership and
reinvest her human and money capital elsewhere. Moreover, this unilat-
eral withdrawal mechanism may be used by the majority to achieve
needed team changes that, absent unanimous consent, cannot be directly
accomplished within the existing partnership. Thus, if a partner's human
capital has become obsolete, but the partner will not retire, the majority
may simply dissolve the old partnership, purchase the firm's assets at a
judicial sale, and form a new partnership that does not include the for-
mer partner. On the other hand, the dissolution process is not without
cost and uncertainty, both of which operate to constrain good-faith adap-
tive acts, unless they are clearly necessary. 55
B. The Problem of Opportunistic Use of the Partnership Adaptive
Mechanism
The partnership dissolution mechanism does not create the same
risk of opportunism as is present in team production organized as an
implicit team or via long-term contract. Partnership law guarantees each
partner full information about partnership affairs, 56 and prevents a part-
ner from simply withdrawing in kind her share of the firm's productive
52 Id. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
53 Id. § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
54 Id. §§ 31, 38, 6 U.L.A. at 376, 456.
55 There have been recent suggestions to change the partnership dissolution rules, principally to
give them more of the entity characteristics of corporate law. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory
Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1987); UPA Revision Subcommittee of the
Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Unifonn Part-
nership Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121 (1987). In 1987, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws undertook a revision of the UPA. It remains unclear whether the
Conference will propose fundamental changes in the longstanding rules of general partnership law.
See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus.
LAw. 427 (1991).
56 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 20, 6 U.L.A. 256 (1969).
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assets. 57 Instead, the ownership of these assets must be untangled by
negotiation or judicial sale. Easy access to information about partnership
business affairs and the cost involved in untangling ownership of partner-
ship assets combine to reduce the likelihood that any partner will be able
to make credible threats of withdrawal founded on claims that objec-
tively unnecessary adaptations are, in fact, necessary. 58
On the other hand, the at-will dissolution mechanism makes possi-
ble a new type of opportunism when the partnership has a significant
amount of team-specific, nonhuman capital value. This opportunism
takes the form of majority or minority action designed to "steal" a por-
tion of the team-specific value belonging to other partners. 59
Majority 6° opportunistic use of the at-will dissolution mechanism
requires expulsion of the minority from the team at a cost to the majority
that is less than the resulting increase in value of their ownership interest
in the team. The majority would hope to proceed as follows: (1) Dissolve
the partnership; (2) force a judicial sale of the partnership's assets; (3)
form a new firm in which only the majority has ownership interests; and
(4) acting as the new firm, purchase the partnership's assets for a bargain
price at the judicial sale.
The majority's bargain purchase opportunity is a function of the
team-specific value of the firm's human capital, the team-specific value of
its nonhuman capital, the majority's share of the latter, and the major-
ity's risk preferences and investment capacity. If the partnership's non-
human capital has significant value, then existing partners should be able
to outbid any outsider for the partnership's saleable assets.61 The out-
sider will have greater cost, including increased exposure to risk, in creat-
ing a new team than will a subgroup of continuing partners, who must
replace a lesser number of the old team. If the majority group has a
57 In rare exceptions, courts may refuse to order a judicial sale and instead, award the partner-
ship's operating assets to the more deserving partner and only cash to the less deserving partner.
See, e-g., Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820 (Or. 1975).
58 Of course, the possibility of opportunism is not eliminated. See Robert W. Hillman, Law
Firms and Their Partner" The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31-50
(1988); Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,439-40
(1987). Nonetheless opportunism is relatively constrained.
59 For a discussion of the costs that the at-will dissolution mechanism enables minority partners
to impose on majority partners, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 241-43.
60 The term "majority" connotes a partner or group of partners that has a larger current team-
specific investment than other partners. For example, if A and B are equal partners, but B has
"loaned" the partnership substantial sums, then B is the "majority" partner, even though their profit
and control rights are equal.
61 Part of a team's value is the premium for creating a successful team. Both outside bidders and
minority partners may have difficulty capturing any part of that premium. If the outside bidder
attempts to employ or associate with members of the old team in order not to lose their team-specific
value, she will incur substantial negotiating and execution costs. In addition, the majority group will
obviously not contract with the minority. For a discussion of the importance of team-creation value,
see Alchian & Woodward, supra note 26, at 70.
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greater share of the partnership's team-specific human capital value than
does the minority group that it seeks to exclude, then the majority group
will likewise be able to bid more for the partnership's assets than will the
minority, because of the majority's expected lesser cost in replacing team
members. Additionally, if the majority group either has a greater ability
to diversify its portfolio against the risks involved in taking on a larger
share of the partnership's team-specific nonhuman capital, or a lesser
aversion to risk, then the majority group will value the partnership's non-
human capital assets more highly than will the minority.62
The opportunistic possibilities presented to a minority partner by
the at-will dissolution mechanism arise not from actual use by the minor-
ity partner of this adaptive device, but instead from the majority's unwill-
ingness to assume greater investment risk. We assume that rational
investors are risk averse. Because general partners have limited wealth
and are personally liable for all partnership debts,63 it is unlikely that
most partners will be able to achieve a diversified investment portfolio.
Therefore, a rational general partner will usually seek to avoid any in-
crease in the portion of her assets invested in team-specific assets, as well
as any decrease in the portion of a fellow partner's wealth that is part of
the joint pool that may be drawn on to pay partnership losses. Both of
these undesired changes occur when a minority partner withdraws from
the firm.64
Given the majority's natural reluctance to assume greater invest-
ment risk, a minority partner may act opportunistically in a variety of
ways. For example, she may threaten to withdraw from the partnership,
thereby dissolving it, unless the majority agrees to an alteration of the
partnership rules to satisfy the minority's adaptive demands. Alterna-
tively, she may shirk in the performance of her partnership duties. In
either case, the minority acts opportunistically in the belief that the ma-
jority will tolerate her opportunism rather than risk precipitating dissolu-
tion of the partnership.
C. Contractual and Judicial Gap-Filling Responses to Opportunism
Made Possible by the Partnership Adaptive Mechanism
Partnership law provides standard form rules that invite contractual
and judicial gap-filling to lessen the opportunistic risks presented by the
62 In part, the majority's bidding advantage may relate to defects in the judicial sale mechanism.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System,
1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 317-18.
63 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969). If the risks of loss are not unlimited and
can be predicted with reasonable certainty and if the partner's wealth is sufficiently great, then the
partner's nonhuman capital portfolio can be diversified.
64 Withdrawal dissolves the firm, forcing partners who desire to continue the partnership's busi-
ness, to buy its assets and pay off the withdrawing partner. See id. §§ 31, 38, 6 U.L.A. at 376, 456.
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at-will dissolution mechanism.65 The most important of these are the
rules defining wrongful dissolution and its consequences.
Partnership law provides each partner an immutable right to dis-
solve her partnership by simple exercise of willA6 However, if dissolution
is caused "in contravention of the partnership agreement," then dissolu-
tion has been caused wrongfully, and the party causing such wrongful
dissolution loses much of her bargaining leverage and is subject to certain
penalties. The wrongful dissolver forfeits her right to force a liquidating
sale of the partnership's assets,67 and is liable to other partners for dam-
ages resulting from her wrongful act.68 Further, the nonwrongfully act-
ing partners have an option to continue the partnership's business
without the wrongful dissolver's consent or participation.6 9 If they exer-
cise that option, the value of the wrongful dissolver's partnership interest
will be determined without considering the goodwill of the partnership's
business. The continuing partners may then either pay the wrongful dis-
solver, in cash, the net value of her partnership interest after damages, or
secure the deferred payment of that sum under a court-approved bond.70
Partners may substantially reduce the risk of certain types of oppor-
tunism by simple contractual provisions linked to the wrongful dissolu-
tion framework. For example, the risk of opportunistic dissolution by
the majority and opportunistic threats of dissolution by the minority may
be greatly reduced by a simple agreement among the partners that the
partnership will endure for a specified term or undertaking. Any dissolu-
tion of the partnership before completion of the agreed undertaking or
term would be in contravention of the partnership agreement, and there-
fore, an act causing wrongful dissolution. 71
On the other hand, if the partners' greatest concern is potential
shirking by minority partners, the risk of this type of opportunism may
be reduced by a contractual agreement among the partners providing
that the majority may expel a partner under specified conditions. If a
partner is expelled pursuant to such contractual power, then dissolution
will not be considered wrongful.72 The expelling partners may continue
65 Scholars continue to disagree as to when a gap may be said to exist in the partnership or
corporate "contract". In my view, these contracts are mostly gaps (see supra note 1 and accompany-
ing text), but the parties have indicated their general gap-filling preferences by the form selected. See
O'Kelley, supra note 16.
66 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969). There is substantial disagreement
over the role and efficiency of immutable rights. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1.
67 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969).
68 Id. § 38(2)(a)(II), 6 U.L.A. at 456.
69 Id. § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 456.
70 Id. § 38(2)(c)(II), 6 U.L.A. at 456.
71 Of course, this increased protection comes at the cost of lost adaptability and increased risk of
opportunistic refusal to agree to objectively justified adaptation requests. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 35-38.
72 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 31(1)(a), 31(2), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969). Although some authorities
disagree (see ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RBSTEIN ON PART-
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the partnership's business, and need only pay to the expelled partner the
"net amount due her from the partnership. ' 73
Unlike the rules applied to wrongful dissolvers, the expulsion-via-
agreement rules impose no liability on the expelled partner for damages
flowing from her shirking, and no penalty in the form of forfeiture of her
share of partnership goodwill.74 Thus, in order to make less likely oppor-
tunistic shirking founded on the majority's aversion to taking on greater
portfolio risk, the contract creating a right of expulsion must also ensure
that the amount due to an expelled partner will be less than the share to
which she would be entitled in a nonwrongful dissolution of the partner-
ship. The need to specify the conditions giving rise to a right of expul-
sion, and the payoff consequences of being so expelled, would likely
involve substantial disagreement and accompanying transactions costs. 75
If partners do not contractually provide a term or undertaking, or a
right to expel the minority, efficiency-minded courts use fiduciary duty or
other gap-filling techniques to minimize the risk of opportunistic action
otherwise made possible by the at-will dissolution mechanism. The na-
ture of the opportunistic risk determines the device selected.
Page v. Page76 is the classic example of judicial intervention to pre-
vent or remedy opportunistic misuse of the at-will dissolution mechanism
by the majority group. In Page, two brothers entered into an oral agree-
ment to jointly own and operate a linen supply business as a partner-
ship.77 Each partner contributed money capital. 78 One of the Page
brothers (the defendant) served as managing partner and through a sepa-
rate corporation supplied the linen and equipment necessary to the day-
to-day operations of the partnership.79 The other Page brother (the
plaintiff) was not active in the business. After eight years of operation
the partnership had lost approximately $62,000.80 In year nine it made a
small profit, and its prospects for future profitability looked bright be-
cause of the recent establishment of Vandenberg Air Force Base in the
NERSHip 7:27-7:29 (1989)), such contractual power probably must be exercised in good faith. See
Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977). Failure to act in good faith would
transform the expulsion into an event causing wrongful dissolution.
73 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 38(l), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969). The expelled partner must also be
discharged from all partnership liabilities.
74 Id.
75 The pay-out-limiting provisions of such agreements may not be enforceable if, ex post, the sum
due the expelled partner seems out of proportion to the damages actually experienced by the expel-
ling partners. See Jones v. Chester, 363 S.W.2d 150, 156-57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962). Such judicial
aversion to liquidated damages provisions will increase the uncertainty costs in trying to draft an
effective expulsion agreement. As to whether efficiency-minded courts should refuse to enforce such
"liquidated damages provisions," see Goetz & Scott, supra note 30.
76 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
77 Id. at 42.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 42, 44.
80 Id. at 42.
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vicinity of the partnership's business."' Early in year ten, despite the
prospect of future profits, the defendant apparently indicated his intent
to dissolve the partnership. At that time, the partnership owed defend-
ant's corporation $47,000, payable on demand.8 2
The defendant's goal in Page could be to "steal" a portion of the
plaintiff's team-specific capital by purchasing the partnership's assets at a
bargain price. The defendant would value the linen supply business as-
sets more highly than outside bidders or the plaintiff because the defend-
ant controls, through his corporation, equipment necessary and suitable
to the operation of the team that would be costly to outsiders to
reproduce, and because he possesses firm-specific human capital that
would be costly for other bidders to replace. The defendant also has a
bidding advantage over the plaintiff by virtue of the team-specific assets
controlled by his corporation. That advantage might be increased by dif-
ferences in the general wealth, and thus, bidding capacities of the plaintiff
and defendant.8 3
On the other hand, defendant may simply be seeking to make an
objectively justifiable adaptation to changed circumstances. The estab-
lishment of Vandenberg Air Force Base may have increased the value of
the partnership's assets, but the defendant may have a more productive
use of his share of the partnership's capital than allowing it to remain
invested in the linen supply business.
Claiming to fear the consequence of dissolution, the plaintiff sought
declaratory relief.8 4 The trial court held that the partnership was for an
implied durational term extending until partnership debts could be re-
paid, and, therefore, any premature dissolution would be wrongful.8 5
The Supreme Court of California reversed, finding that the plaintiff
had "failed to prove any facts from which an agreement to continue the
partnership for a term may be implied."86 Additionally the court advised
the parties about the fiduciary limits on the defendant partner's use of his
dissolution power:
A partner at will is not bound to remain in a partnership, regardless of
whether the business is profitable or unprofitable. A partner may not, how-
ever, by use of adverse pressure 'freeze out' a co-partner and appropriate
the business to his own use. A partner may not dissolve a partnership to
gain the benefits of the business for himself, unless he fully compensates his
co-partner for his share of the prospective business opportunity ....
[P]laintiff has the power to dissolve the partnership by express notice
to defendant. If, however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and
81 Id. at 44.
82 Id.
83 In other words, the defendant is the stronger and, thus, the "majority" partner. See supra
note 60.
84 Page, 359 P.2d at 43.
85 Id. at 42.
86 Id. at 43.
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violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his own use the
new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his co-
partner, the dissolution would be wrongful and the plaintiff would be liable
as provided by [U.P.A. § 38(2)] for violation of the implied agreement
not to exclude defendant wrongfully from the partnership business
opportunity.8 7
Some commentators assert that Page unduly restricts the adaptabil-
ity of majority partners."" These commentators argue that if the parties
had wished to fetter the majority partner's withdrawal rights, they would
have specified a durational term.8 9 This view overlooks the longstanding
role of fiduciary duty in partnership law90 and the significance of the
parties selection of partnership form instead of sole proprietorship form.
Assuming rational actors, selection of general partnership form instead
of sole proprietorship form signals to an efficiency-minded judge that the
parties desired that more stringent judicial constraints be placed on the
majority partner's adaptability than would be the case if the majority
partner were the firm's sole proprietor.9 1 Consistent with this expecta-
tion, Page recognizes that majority partners have substantially less adapt-
ability than do sole proprietors.
A case that illustrates an appropriate judicial response to both mi-
nority shirking and opportunistic demands for alteration of partnership
terms is Drashner v. Sorenson. 92 The plaintiff, Drashner and the two de-
fendants formed an equal partnership to operate a real estate, loan, and
insurance agency in Rapid City, South Dakota.93 The business was prof-
itable, but harmony short-lived. Within six months after commencement
of the partnership, the partners were having bitter disagreements center-
ing on Drashner's desire to change the partners' agreement that a sub-
stantial portion of partnership earnings be retained to cover operating
expense rather than distributed to the partners for their personal use.
The plaintiff sought a judicial decree of dissolution, and defendants coun-
87 Id. at 44-45.
88 See Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Con-
sideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1,
27-33 (1982); Jason S. Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Coop-
erative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992).
89 Hillman, supra note 88, at 33.
90 This role is often described by reference to Judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon,
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), in which the court imposed restrictions on a joint venturer's right to
profit from opportunities coming to fruition well after the expiration of the venture's specified term:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty
of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
Id. at 546.
91 See O'Kelley, supra note 16.
92 63 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954).
93 Id. at 256-57.
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terclaimed seeking similar relief. The trial court found for the defend-
ants, holding that Drashner's actions had caused a wrongful dissolution
of the partnership, thereby giving defendants the normal rights granted
to nonwrongfully acting partners. 94 The South Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed, describing the facts supporting the trial court's determination
as follows:
The breach between the parties resulted from a continuing controversy
over the right of plaintiff to withdraw sufficient money from the partnership
to defray his living expenses ....
As an outgrowth of this crucial difference, there was evidence from
which a court could reasonably believe that plaintiff neglected the business
and spent too much time in a nearby bar during business hours. At a time
when plaintiff had overdrawn his partners and was also indebted to one of
defendants for personal advances, he requested $100 and his request was
refused. In substance he then said, according to the testimony of the de-
fendant Deis, that he would see that he "gets some money to run on", and if
they "didn't give it to him he was going to dissolve the partnership and see
that he got it." Thereafter plaintiff pressed his claims through counsel, and
eventually brought this action to dissolve the partnership. The claim so
persistently asserted was contrary to the partnership agreement found by
the court.95
The court in Drashner apparently succeeded in identifying minority
opportunism. However, the line between legitimate policy disputes and
ordinary negligence on one hand, and opportunistic minority action on
the other, is murky at best. Majority partners situated like the defend-
ants in Drashner may take the position that the minority partner's ac-
tions have caused a wrongful at-will dissolution and claim the right to
continue the firm. But if a court disagrees and finds dissolution non-
wrongful, then the majority will be forced to take on greater investment
risk in purchasing the firm's assets at fair value and, then, buying out the
minority's partnership interest. Accordingly, minority partners are
likely to have substantial room for opportunism founded on majority
aversion to taking on greater investment risk whenever a partnership has
substantial team-specific, nonhuman capital value.96
Partnership form thus exposes majority partners to two risks: the
risk that a minority partner will extort unfair changes in team rules by
opportunistically threatening to dissolve the partnership and the risk that
a minority partner will shirk, content in the belief that the majority will
be unwilling to expel her for fear that a court might label the resulting
dissolution wrongful.
94 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
95 Drashner, 63 N.W.2d at 258-59.
96 Of course, the downside of Page is that its constraints on majority opportunism increase the
room for minority opportunism.
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IV. A THEORY OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATE FORM
A. Corporation Law and the Archetypical Closely Held Corporation
Jointly owned firms may be conceived of as occupying a continuum
ranging from two-owner, closely held firms that could be organized al-
most as efficiently outside of a firm or as a sole proprietorship, to publicly
held firms having thousands of shareholders and enormous amounts of
human and money capital. 97 As explained in Part III, general partner-
ship law provides an optimal governance structure for closely held firms
located at the small end of this spectrum. As closely held firms move
toward the publicly held end of the spectrum, general partnership-law
governance rules become less optimal and at some point, corporate form
becomes the value-maximizing choice.98
In an archetypical closely held corporation located near the margin
where organization as a general partnership would be equally efficient,
each shareholder will make significant team-specific investments. Ex
ante each shareholder will expect that her employment with the firm will
continue indefinitely and that she will share in the firm's profits ratably
along with other shareholders. Moreover, each shareholder will expect
that she will be able to withdraw her money capital investments from the
firm under certain circumstances. However, each shareholder will attach
greater value to the firm's adaptability to changed circumstances and to
elimination of the risk of shirking or opportunistic use of withdrawal
rights by a minority shareholder than to the value of guaranteeing a mi-
nority shareholder's right to continue as an employee, to share ratably in
the firm's profits, or to withdraw money capital from the firm.
Consistent with the expectations of shareholders in an archetypical
closely held corporation, corporation-law norms99 make it substantially
easier for a closely held firm to accomplish needed adaptations to the
team's rules or make-up and expose the incorporated team to much less
risk of minority opportunism than would be the case for a similarly situ-
ated firm operating under general partnership norms. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a closely held firm's needs evolve, or the skills of one of its
97 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
98 At this point, I am still ignoring the distorting effect of tax and limited liability rules. The
spectrum I am describing locates firms only in terms of their internal governance needs. These needs
are a function of the magnitude and distribution of team specific capital, the team's expected dura-
tion, and team members' wealth and risk characteristics. The distorting effect of tax or limited
liability rules is discussed infra at Parts IV.B, IV.C.2(b), and IV.C.2(c).
99 Corporation law provides an off-the-rack governance structure for jointly owned, closely held
firms, the key features of which are: (1) Separation of ownership function into three functional
realms - shareholders, directors, and officers; (2) no dissolution at-will by minority investors; (3)
investors have no guaranteed right to serve as corporate employees; (4) majority rule on all major
decisions; (5) limited liability for shareholders; (6) free transferability of shares; and (7) minority
shareholder expectations are afforded legal protection primarily by their ability to seek involuntary
dissolution or relief founded on the majority's alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
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joint owners erode, so that it becomes objectively justifiable from an ex
post perspective to change such joint owner's duties or compensation or
to discharge her from the firm's employ. The corporation's adaptive
mechanism is the board of directors acting by majority rule. Such mech-
anism enables the majority to insist on a change in the duties or compen-
sation of a minority owner without incurring significant costs. If the
minority shareholder is unhappy with her new status she may withdraw
her human capital from the team (if not already discharged) and sell her
shares. 100 Alternatively, she may bring a petition for involuntary disso-
lution on the grounds that the majority's actions are oppressive or that
equitable relief is necessary to protect the minority's reasonable expecta-
tions or interests.10( Each of these protective devices is imperfect. If the
minority shareholder sells her shares, she is likely to receive substantially
less than she would if the corporation were dissolved and its assets sold
as a going concern. If she seeks equitable relief, she must carry the bur-
den of proving predicate facts entitling her to relief.
As the foregoing summary suggests, corporation law does not give
majority shareholders absolute discretion. Nonetheless, corporation law
is tilted in favor of the majority. In contrast, partnership-law norms al-
low the majority to make major adaptations without the minority's con-
sent, but only by dissolving the partnership. Dissolution normally
exposes the partnership's assets to judicial sale and gives the minority
owner an option to force a repurchase of her partnership interest either
via private negotiation or out of the proceeds of such sale.102 Addition-
ally, the majority's decision to dissolve carries with it the risk that the
dissolution may be labeled wrongful and that the minority partner may
be awarded control over the firm's assets. In other words, compared to
corporation law, partnership law is tilted toward protection of the
minority. 103
The downsides of corporate statutory governance norms, especially
when compared to partnership statutory governance rules, are the rela-
tive lack of assurance that individual adaptive needs will be satisfied and
the relatively greater risk of majority opportunism posed because minor-
ity shareholder's may not withdraw their money capital from the firm. If
a partner finds it value-maximizing to withdraw her capital from the firm
and invest it elsewhere, the at-will dissolution mechanism insures that
she will be able to do so. In a corporation, a minority shareholder has no
similar adaptive rights. 0 4 On the other hand, the corporation law pref-
100 Under corporate norms, shares are freely transferable. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 202 (1991); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1991).
101 For a thorough review of the state of involuntary dissolution law, see Thompson, supra note 3.
102 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
104 This is, of course, a fatal defect in the view of Hetherington and Dooley. See Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 5, at 1-6, 34-50.
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erence for majority adaptability combines with the lack of a unilateral
minority withdrawal right to insulate the majority from the threat of mi-
nority opportunism. A minority shareholder simply has no ability to
withdraw unilaterally, and thus, no ability to extort an objectively unjus-
tifiable change in terms from the majority.
Under the foregoing analysis, the archetypical closely held corpora-
tion is functionally somewhat further from the marginal point at which
ownership as a jointly owned firm or outside of a firm would be equally
efficient than is an archetypical general partnership. The characteristics
that place the archetypical closely held corporation further from this
margin are the relatively greater expected value of its team-specific non-
human capital, and the greater ex ante cost that its owners attach to
possible minority opportunism. It can be hypothesized, then, that ra-
tional owners of a jointly owned firm select corporate form over partner-
ship form, all other things being equal, when the expected gains from
greater team adaptability and diminished risk of minority opportunism
more than offset the expected losses from decreased individual ability to
adapt and increased majority opportunism. 10 5
B. The Nonarchetypical Closely Held Corporation
If internal governance needs were the sole basis for choosing organi-
zational form and if all investors were rational and well-informed, then
close corporations would come into existence only when corporate norms
provided, ex ante, a better balance between opportunism and adaptability
for a particular jointly owned firm than would be provided by alternative
organizational forms. However, it is commonly believed that a large
number of nonarchetypical close corporations are formed to take advan-
tage of limited liability, even though corporation law governance norms
are not optimal for such firms. 106
We can assume that individuals rationally form nonarchetypical
close corporations whenever they calculate ex ante that the value flowing
from limited liability will exceed the costs resulting because corporate
105 The failure to recognize the central function served by corporate law is true of commentators
on partnership form as well. Consider this comment by Larry Ribstein:
Because free transferability of partnership property rights is not feasible, dissolution at will
provides an important escape route. But dissolution at will gives the dissolving partner the
power to appropriate firm assets and inflict significant costs on the other partners. Thus, the
U.P.A. escape route amounts to handing each partner a cache of dynamite.
Ribstein, supra note 55, at 360.
Ribstein tacitly assumes that partnership norms should be designed to accommodate rational joint
owners of closely held teams with substantial team-specific value. In fact, that is the role of corpo-
rate law.
106 Limited liability allows risk-averse investors to diversify their investment portfolios at least to
some extent. For an economic analysis of limited liability, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
10, at 40-62; Susan Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 601 (1985).
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form provides a less desirable governance structure than would some
other business form. Further, we can hypothesize that nonarchetypical
corporations are of two main types-sole-proprietorship corporations and
partnership corporations. Sole-proprietorship corporations are corpora-
tions that would have been organized as unincorporated sole proprietor-
ships except for the distorting effect of limited liability rules. Partnership
corporations are corporations that would have been organized as general
partnerships except for the same distorting effect.
C. Ex Ante Contracting or Ex Post Gap-Filling in the Close
Corporation Setting
1. The Need for Ex Ante Contracting or Ex Post Gap-Filling.-
The foregoing subparts of this Part explain why archetypical and non-
archetypical close corporations choose corporate form as a starting point,
but they also suggest that such firms would find corporate norms less
than perfect. The closer an archetypical close corporation is to the mar-
gin where organization as a general partnership would be equally effi-
cient, the less clear-cut is the choice between partnership and corporate
norms. For partnership corporations, the corporate norms are in fact
less desirable than partnership norms. And for sole-proprietorship cor-
porations, the preferred allocation of governance powers and risks would
be that provided by sole proprietorship form.
There are two mechanisms by which the governance rules of closely
held corporations can be made more optimal. First, the investors in such
corporations can contractually modify the corporate rules to achieve an
optimal set of governance rules for their particular corporation. Second,
courts can modify the governance rules ex post via efficiency-minded use
of their equitable powers.
2. Contractual Responses to Shortcomings in Close Corporation
Governance Rules.-
(a) Introductory note.-Corporation statutes in all states now al-
low shareholders substantial freedom to modify the corporate adaptive
rules by unanimous contractual agreement.107 This contractual freedom
may be used to tailor corporate form to achieve the desired balance of
opportunism and adaptability. The foregoing analysis provides a basis
for predicting what types of contracting devices will be value maximizing
from an ex ante point of view. The remainder of this section summarizes
those predictions.
107 Such agreements may occur as provisions in the articles of incorporation or by-laws, or in
separate written agreements. In some states such agreements can be accomplished with less transac-
tion costs or less uncertainty if the shareholders elect to be covered by special close corporation
default or enabling rules.
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(b) Contractual modifications in partnership corporations.-Part-
nership corporations would choose general partnership form as a starting
point except for the distorting effect of limited liability. For these firms,
corporate form exposes minority investors to too great a risk of majority
opportunism and provides them with too little adaptability. Accord-
ingly, rational investors in partnership corporations may find it value en-
hancing to modify the corporate norms contractually. For example,
involuntary transformation to passive status may be prevented by a
shareholder agreement providing that each shareholder shall be contin-
ued as an employee and director and shall be entitled to receive an agreed
share of corporate earnings until and unless otherwise unanimously
agreed.10 8 Likewise, the problem of investment illiquidity that restricts
the ability of minority shareholders to adapt to changed circumstances
can be eliminated by a shareholder agreement giving each shareholder a
right to be bought out for fair value by either the corporation or nonwith-
drawing shareholders.
Available evidence suggests that relatively few closely held corpora-
tions adopt such contractual devices.109 This may be because there are
relatively few partnership corporations. Alternatively, it may be that the
cost of negotiating and executing these agreements is greater than the
present value of the expected cost of having corporation governance
norms instead of partnership governance norms. After all, if investors in
a jointly owned firm prefer partnership governance rules, then the
amount of expected team-specific money capital investment must be rela-
tively small. Therefore, the discount in value from using corporation-law
governance norms instead of partnership-law governance norms may
also be small. It is also possible that contractual modifications are not
more widely used because, while it is relatively easy to create minority
shareholders' rights contractually, it is very difficult to do so in a way
that replicates the balance between opportunism and adaptability
achieved by partnership law. For example, the risk of minority opportu-
nism presented by an unconditional contractual buy-out right may be
greater than the risk posed by operating as an at-will partnership because
108 The longstanding judicial unwillingness to enforce shareholders' agreements is derided by
many commentators. See, e.g., EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 235 (commenting on
the famous shareholder agreement case, McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934)). How-
ever, the rule prohibiting complete sterilization of directors' discretion would be value-maximizing if
all close corporations were archetypical. In such case, it could be presumed irrational to completely
sterilize the directors' discretion because by definition archetypical corporations choose corporate
form because they prefer majority adaptability over the risks of minority opportunism posed by
forms or contracts that place primary emphasis on protecting the minority from majority opportu-
nism. Perhaps the decline of the old rule prohibiting sterilization is traceable to the emergence of a
new class of close corporations-the partnership corporation. For an interesting look at the evolu-
tion of state corporation law, see Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992).
109 See F. HODGE O'NEIL & ROBERT E. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, § 1.18
(3d ed. 1990).
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opportunistic withdrawal will not be subject to the constraining effects of
the fiduciary duty and wrongful dissolution provisions of partnership
law.110
(c) Contractual modifications in archetypical closely held corpora-
tions.-Archetypical close corporations located near the margin where
partnership-law norms would be equally efficient might find it value-en-
hancing to make minor modifications to corporate form designed to in-
crease the minority's adaptability and protection from majority
opportunism while preserving the majority's discretion and protection
from minority opportunism. On the other hand, the relatively small
amount of team-specific capital at stake may not justify the costs and
risks of error involved in ex ante contracting designed to fine tune the
firm's governance rules.
For example, rational investors in a near-the-margin archetypical
close corporation might find it value-maximizing to contractually pro-
vide for the repurchase of a minority shareholder's stock in the event of
ordinary retirement or death. However, such firms would be unlikely to
give minority shareholders an option to have her shares repurchased at
anytime. Such an unconditional contractual buy-out right would create
a serious risk of minority opportunism, the very risk that efficiency-
minded owners of an archetypical closely held corporation seek to avoid
by choosing corporate form."1 '
Likewise, investors in a near-the-margin closely held corporation
would be unlikely to grant minority investors a contractually fixed right
to continued employment and to a predetermined share of profits. Such
rights would undermine the adaptability of the team and create a risk of
minority opportunism in the form of shirking, two problems that effi-
ciency-minded joint owners in an archetypical closely held corporation
seek to avoid by choosing corporate form instead of partnership form.
(d) Contractual modifications in sole-proprietorship corporations.-
Rational investors in sole-proprietorship corporations would choose sole
proprietorship form except for the distorting effect of limited liability. So
long as sole-proprietorship corporations have only one shareholder, the
corporate governance norms are irrelevant. The sole shareholder con-
trols the corporation, and the corporation as proprietor has the same
110 Hetherington and Dooley apparently overlooked the variety of adaptive and opportunism-
preventing purposes served by the partnership adaptive mechanism, as supplemented by informed
judicial application of the wrongful dissolution mechanism. This may explain why they suggested
that the problem of majority opportunism, or oppression, can be solved by providing minority share-
holders with an immutable statutory right to have their shares repurchased by the corporation for
fair value, regardless of fault, whenever it suits their individual interest. See Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 5, at 41-46.
111 Easterbrook and Fischel make a similar argument but do not limit it to the archetypical cor-
poration. EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 10, at 238.
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right to control and discharge at-will employees as would an unincorpo-
rated proprietor. However, the principal investor in a sole-proprietor-
ship corporation may at some point transfer a minority share interest to
one or more key employees as an incentive-alignment device.
Creating minority share interests will expose the majority share-
holder to potential judicial second-guessing via fiduciary duty suits and
petitions for involuntary dissolution pursued by disgruntled minority
shareholders. Therefore, creating such interests may increase the ex-
pected cost of minority shareholder shirking 12 or opportunistic threats
to withdraw from the firm. On the other hand, creating such minority
share interests may create even greater expected gains from increased
effort and loyalty by key employees who now have a proprietary stake in
the corporation.
If the sole shareholder in a sole-proprietorship corporation wishes to
create minority share interests without greatly increasing the risks from
exposure to shareholder litigation, then ex ante contracting is in order.
The indicated contract would confirm the corporation's right to dis-
charge the employee at-will and would provide that the corporation may
repurchase the minority's shares when the minority shareholder leaves
the corporation's employ either voluntarily or involuntarily. To preserve
incentive effects, but minimize the risk of opportunism, the share repur-
chase agreement should provide a purchase price formula that will penal-
ize the minority shareholder who leaves the corporation's employ
prematurely. 113
3. Judicial Responses to Shortcomings in Close Corporation Govern-
ance Rules-A Theory of Efficiency-Minded Judging.-
(a) An overview.-The preceding Parts of this Article develop what
might be called a Coasean theory of rational form selection. 114 Before
entering into a prospective venture, rational investors engage in a com-
112 Such risk would be increased to the extent that the majority shareholder would be more un-
willing than a sole proprietor to take future adaptive steps-such as discharging the minority from
the corporation's employ-for fear that the minority shareholder would prevail in a subsequent
lawsuit or petition for involuntary dissolution.
113 Such agreements present problems for efficiency-minded courts only when the parties' intent
is ambiguous. For example, suppose that a sole shareholder sells shares to a key employee subject to
a share repurchase agreement that requires the employee to sell her shares back to the corporation at
book value if she ceases to be an employee of the corporation before a specified date. If the value of
the corporation's shares sharply increases before that date, what remedies if any should the disgrun-
tled employee have-the rights of an at-will employee or the greater protection afforded by fiduciary
duty? To what extent does the answer depend on the clarity of the parties contract? See Jordan v.
Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987); Magic Woods, Inc. v. Chaplin, No. 64,054, 1990
Kan. App. LEXIS 508 (Kan. Ct. App. July 13, 1990); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990); Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1989); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 535
N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989).
114 See O'Kelley, supra note 16.
87:216 (1992)
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 245 1992-1993
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
parative search for best investment. 115 If a cooperative endeavor is se-
lected, then the prospective venturers must choose for that venture the
organizational form that offers the optimal balance between adaptability
to changed circumstances and risk of opportunism. Finally, the ventur-
ers must decide whether contractual modifications to the state-provided
rules of the chosen form will be value enhancing.
The Coasean theory of rational form selection explains the role
played by efficiency-minded judges when resolving a dispute between mi-
nority and majority shareholders in a closely held corporation. If the
parties are presumed to have chosen corporate form rationally and for
governance reasons, then the efficiency-minded judge will resolve the
particular dispute in a manner consistent with the level of majority dis-
cretion normally afforded by corporate form. In other words, the court
will assume that these rational investors wished the majority to have
greater adaptability and freedom from minority opportunism than would
have been afforded by partnership form, but less adaptability and free-
dom from minority opportunism than would have been provided if the
venture had been organized as an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
Understanding the Coasean theory of rational form selection allows
efficiency-minded judges to provide litigants with what rational investors
"would have wanted"-the mix of opportunism and adaptability com-
mon to the business form they selected. However, this Coasean theory
does not enable judges to determine whether a particular complaining
minority shareholder should prevail. Rather, it enables judges to deter-
mine that such litigant must be asked to carry a burden of proof and
persuasion that is consistent with the mix of opportunism and adaptabil-
ity provided by corporate form.
The theory of efficiency-minded judging just traced assumes that in-
vestors both choose organizational form rationally and that the state pro-
vides a sufficient number of standard forms from which prospective
investors may choose. But what if the state provides insufficient forms or
if investors do not choose organizational form rationally? 116
As discussed above, investors in partnership corporations, sole-pro-
prietorship corporations, and in near-the-margin archetypical closely
held corporations would find it value enhancing from an ex ante point of
view if they could costlessly replace the governance norms provided by
115 That investment which offers the most attractive return on invested human and money capital
given the investor's taste for risk.
116 Consistent with the view that partnership corporations exist when investors choose corporate
form because of the distorting effect of limited liability, it could be argued that states should provide
a business form that provides both limited liability and partnership-like internal governance rules.
The Limited Liability Company appears to be such a business form. Legislation authorizing limited
liability companies was enacted by Wyoming in 1977, by Florida in 1982, and by twelve other states
in 1991-1992. Once this form is generally available the number of partnership corporations should
diminish.
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corporate form with more suitable rules. However, there are at least
three possible reasons why investors in these firms would not contract for
the "perfect" governance structure. First, contracting is not costless, and
the costs of contracting might exceed the predicted benefits. Second, ac-
tual investors may not be fully rational, resulting in mistaken failure to
contract. Third, rational investors might predict that courts will exercise
their equitable gap-filling powers to provide optimal governance rules to
the parties ex post, thereby making ex ante contracting unnecessary.
The foregoing analysis suggests that in a large number of close cor-
poration cases the court must face the possibility that the shareholders
did not modify corporate form to achieve the mix of opportunism and
adaptability which rational investors would have viewed as ideal from an
ex ante perspective. An efficiency-minded court responds to this possibil-
ity by deciding whether the cost to society of applying a rule which simi-
larly situated rational investors might not have selected exceeds the costs
of attempting to provide the governance structure which rational share-
holders presumably would have selected.1 17
There are two potential costs of expost judicial contracting. First, if
courts contract for the parties this will create disincentives for the parties
themselves to identify via contract the mix between opportunism and
adaptability that they prefer. A court should create this disincentive
only if it is likely that the court will be able to determine ex post better
than the parties themselves could ex ante which governance structure is
"ideal." The court's answer to this may depend on how likely it seems
that investors in closely held corporations will be prevented from reach-
ing the "ideal" governance structure by either rationality defects or the
costs of contracting.
Second, the court must consider how likely it is that it will make a
mistake. For example, how likely is it that the court will apply partner-
ship law rules to a closely held corporation when similarly situated ra-
tional investors would not make that selection? The possibility of such
judicial errors will result in a devaluation of close corporation form. In
other words, the possibility that courts will wrongly guess that the inves-
tors did not prefer corporation governance norms will decrease the value
of future investments in archetypical corporations because investors will
be less able to depend on the freedom from minority opportunism and
majority adaptability which they desire.
(b) An illustrative case.-
(i) An introductory note.-Courts and commentators often
misuse the partnership analogy and "would have wanted" gap-filling
117 Notice that this is very different from saying that efficiency-minded courts should provide the
precise substantive result to a particular dispute that rational parties would have selected ex ante.
That is beyond the pale. However, it is reasonable to attempt to provide the "perfect" governance
structure.
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formula. Justice Tauro's opinion in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. I'8
and Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's criticism of the substantive
decision in that case1 19 provide examples of both types of misuse. Thus,
Donahue provides an opportunity to illustrate the theory of rational form
selection and efficiency-minded judging traced above.
(ii) Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.-Henry Rodd and Jo-
seph Donahue joined the employ of Rodd Electrotype Company, then
operating under another name, in 1935 and 1936, respectively. Rodd
specialized in general management. Donahue specialized in the manu-
facturing end of the business.
When Rodd and Donahue joined Rodd Electrotype it was a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Royal Electrotype Company ("Royal"). 120 Over
the years, Royal made some of its shares available to Rodd, Donahue,
and Lawrence W. Kelley. By 1955, Rodd had acquired 200 shares, Kel-
ley 25 shares, and Donahue had purchased 50 shares "at the suggestion
of Harry Rodd, who hoped to interest Donahue in the business." 121
Royal retained 725 of the 1000 outstanding shares. 122
In June of 1955, Rodd and Donahue became the sole shareholders
of Rodd Electrotype. 123 Control was obtained by having Rodd Elec-
trotype repurchase the 725 shares owned by Royal and the 25 shares
owned by Kelley. In these repurchases Rodd Electrotype immediately
expended $76,000 in cash and executed notes to Royal in the total
amount of $60,000.124 Most of the cash used by Rodd Electrotype was
loaned to it by Harry Rodd, who mortgaged his house to obtain some of
the needed funds. The purchase money notes were paid off by Rodd
Electrotype over the period from 1955 to 1960.125 As a result of these
transactions, Rodd owned 200, and Donahue 50, of the 250 outstanding
shares of Rodd Electrotype. 126
From June, 1955 until 1970, the composition and nature of the un-
derlying team "owned" by Rodd Electrotype continued to evolve and
adapt to changed circumstances. Gradually, the roles of Rodd and Don-
ahue in the firm decreased. Charles Rodd became corporate vice presi-
dent in 1962, a director in 1963, and succeeded his father as president
and general manager in 1965.127 In 1964, Frederick Rodd, another of
118 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
119 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 245-48.
120 Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505.
121 Id. at 509.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 248 1992-1993
The Close Corporation Contract
Harry's sons, replaced Donahue as plant superintendent. 128 During this
period, Harry Rodd gave 119 of his shares in Rodd Electrotype to his
two sons and a daughter, Phyllis Mason. 129 These changes apparently
occurred harmoniously.
In the period from May 1970 to April 1971, any remaining harmony
in the relation between Donahue and the posttransformation firm was
shattered. During that period Harry Rodd liquidated his remaining
shares in the corporation. He gave 30 shares to his children, 45 shares
were acquired by Rodd Electrotype for $800 per share, and the remain-
ing 6 shares were acquired by his children, also for $800 per share.'30
When Donahue then requested that Rodd Electrotype purchase his 50
shares, the corporation refused. 131 Subsequently, Donahue sued chal-
lenging the corporate repurchase of Harry Rodd's shares and seeking
equitable relief. The trial court dismissed the petition on the merits, and
the appeals court affirmed. 132
Justice Tauro, speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, analyzed these facts by reference to the following partnership
analogy:
[W]e deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substan-
tial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and
operations of the corporation. As thus defined, the close corporation bears
striking resemblance to a partnership .... In a partnership, a partner who
feels abused by his fellow partners may cause dissolution by his "express
wll ... at any time" ... and recover his share of partnership assets and
accumulated profits .... The minority stockholder, by definition lacking
fifty per cent of the corporate shares, can never "authorize" the corporation
to file a petition for dissolution .... Thus, in a close corporation, the
minority stockholders may be trapped in a disadvantageous situation. No
outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minor-
ity. The outsider would have the same difficulties .... Because of the
fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the
trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enter-
prise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation,
we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another sub-
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another. 133
Justice Tauro concluded that in the context of a closely held corpo-
ration's repurchase of shares from a controlling shareholder, the major-
ity's fiduciary duty could only be satisfied by allowing the minority to
128 Id.
129 Id. at 510.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 511.
132 Id. at 508.
133 Id. at 514-15.
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participate in the repurchase on the same terms as the majority.134
(iii) Easterbrook and Fischel's Analysis.-Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel believe that efficiency-minded judges would not have
granted relief to Donahue. Their arguments are based on their version of
the "would have wanted" gap-filling rule.
If a court is unavoidably entwined in a dispute, it must decide what the
parties would have bargained for had they written a completely contingent
contract. The difficulties that result when a court misses this point are illus-
trated by the much applauded case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
Grave reflections on the plight of minority investors in closely held
corporations and stirring proclamations of the fiduciary duty of the major-
ity fill the opinion. Completely overlooked in all of this rhetoric was the
basic question-which outcome would the parties have selected had they
contracted in anticipation of this contingency? Although no one can an-
swer such a question with certainty (precisely because the parties did not),
it is most unlikely that they would have selected a rule requiring an equal
opportunity for all. Buyouts facilitate the retirement of a manager who, by
virtue of advancing age and poor health, no longer contributes .... Buy-
sell agreements provide some liquidity and ensure that the identity of the
managers and the investors remains the same, reducing agency problems.
At the same time, the limited scope of the obligation reduces the cost of
cash payouts .... No comparable commonly used agreement requires a
firm to purchase all shares if it buys any.135
(iv) Rational form selection and efficiency-minded judging in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.-Under the theory developed in this
Article, Donahue is a relatively easy case. An efficiency-minded judge
must first determine whether at the outset of the incorporated venture
rational investors in Donahue's and Rodd's shoes would have preferred
sole proprietorship or general partnership internal governance norms to
the norms of corporation law.
Rodd Electrotype Co. was clearly not a partnership corporation
when Rodd and Donahue became its sole owners in 1955. Rodd had
mortgaged his house to consummate his stock purchase, which indicates
both that the corporation's value was dependent on firm-specific assets
viewed by outside lenders as risky collateral and that Rodd had tied up
most of his personal wealth in this transaction. Accordingly, a rational
Rodd would have been unwilling to invest in this venture if subjected to
the risk of minority opportunism presented by general partnership law
and its at-will withdrawal mechanism.
Nor should Rodd Electrotype Co. be described as a sole-proprietor-
ship corporation. The same facts that show why a rational Rodd would
134 Id. at 518.
135 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 245-46.
250
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not agree to general partnership norms ex ante also show that a rational
Donahue would not have agreed to invest if Rodd insisted on having the
same discretion over his invested capital as would a sole proprietor. If
Rodd merely allowed Donahue to continue as a shareholder as an incen-
tive-compensation device, then sole-proprietorship characterization
would be plausible. However, Rodd would not likely have viewed Don-
ahue's stock retention as merely an incentive-compensation device. A
rational, risk-averse Rodd would not have wanted to put any more of his
personal wealth at risk than was already necessary to finance his own
stock purchases. Accordingly, a rational Rodd would have viewed Don-
ahue as a co-investor, and would have realized that Donahue would not
agree to continue his investment if Rodd insisted on sole-proprietor-like
freedom from fiduciary duty.
Justice Tauro's mistake was in characterizing an archetypical corpo-
ration as a partnership corporation. While under some circumstances it
might be value-enhancing for courts to apply partnership-like rules to
partnership corporations, it would never be efficient to apply such rules
to archetypical close corporations. Thus, Justice Tauro's decision was
unsustainably overbroad. Under Tauro's version of the partnership anal-
ogy, investors in any close corporation are viewed as having the same
governance needs as investors in an archetypical general partnership.
Logically, then, any majority shareholder decision that gave minority
shareholders something other than their rights as quasi-partners would
be suspect. As a result, minority shareholders would have substantial
room to threaten suit opportunistically, undercutting one of the principal
governance reasons for choosing corporate form. Recognizing this de-
fect, the court quickly backed away from the implications of its over-
broad rationale.1 36
Easterbrook and Fischel's analysis also suggests that the Donahue
court reached the wrong result-that is a different outcome than the par-
ties themselves would have wanted had they been able to costlessly bar-
gain at the outset. Their misuse of the "would have wanted" formula,
like Tauro's misuse of the partnership analogy, seems rooted in the belief
that all closely held corporations have similar governance needs.1 37 If
this is accepted as true, then an efficiency-minded court can observe how
these larger close corporations solve particular problems and supply the
same solutions to small close corporations who cannot afford the cost of
136 In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976), the Supreme Judicial
Court backed away from the implications of Donahue and recognized that "[t]he majority conced-
edly have certain rights to what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation which should
be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority." Id. at 663. The court
then stated that the majority must prevail if it can show a legitimate business purpose for its actions
unless the minority can show that such purpose could have been served by means less injurious to
the minority. Id.
137 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 252.
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providing such solutions for themselves via ex ante contracting. Con-
versely, if these larger corporations do not choose to provide rules for
certain situations, then an efficiency-minded court should not provide
such rules for smaller close corporations either. Under this corollary
rule, Easterbrook and Fischel view the decision in Donahue as almost
certainly wrong because it is not common for close corporation buy-sell
agreements to require a firm to purchase the minority's shares if it de-
cides to buy the majority's.
The theory of rational form selection outlined above suggests that
Easterbrook and Fischel are wrong in assuming that larger and smaller
close corporations have similar internal governance needs. Rational in-
vestors in partnership corporations and sole-proprietorship corporations
would not choose corporate form but for the distorting effect of limited
liability. Rational investors in close-to-the margin archetypical corpora-
tions would have much less fear of minority opportunism than would
investors in larger close corporations where the magnitude of team-spe-
cific investment would make dissolution-at-will or similar buyout rules
unthinkable. Accordingly, the failure of larger firms to contract for an
equal opportunity rule does not suggest that such a rule would not be
efficient for partnership corporations and sole-proprietorship corpora-
tions. Nor does it necessarily suggest that an equal opportunity rule
would be inefficient for near-the-margin archetypical corporations, at
least if the rule were limited to purchases after the death or retirement of
the founding shareholders.
Easterbrook and Fischel's second error is the use of the "would have
wanted" formula to predict the correct outcome in particular cases. The
theory of efficiency-minded judging outlined above suggests a more mod-
est goal. Efficiency-minded judges provide the result investors would
have wanted when they are sensitive to the signalling effect provided by
initial form selection. Rational investors understand, in general, the
adaptive characteristics and opportunistic risks that normally attend cor-
porate, partnership, and sole proprietorship form. They adopt a particu-
lar form in the expectation that should unresolvable disputes arise, courts
will provide outcomes that are consistent with the investors' ex ante gov-
ernance expectations. Accordingly, efficiency-minded courts will provide
minority shareholder in archetypical close corporations with the level of
equitable protection common to close corporation form.13 8
Under this theory, an efficiency-minded court must require the com-
plaining shareholder to carry at least some burden of proof and persua-
sion. The goal is to provide the majority with less discretion than they
would have as sole proprietors, but more discretion than they would have
as general partners. This leaves the court with a large range of possible
proper outcomes. In some cases, a court-ordered buy out might be ap-
138 See O'Kelley, supra note 16.
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propriate. In others, the minority should be denied relief. However, the
outcome in a particular case should be criticized only if it will result in
inefficient governance rules for archetypical corporations. In other
words, a particular decision should be criticized only if it will give major-
ity shareholders in archetypical close corporations as much discretion as
a sole proprietorship or as little discretion as a general partner.
V. CONCLUSION
Reasoning by analogy has always been central to legal argument.
This Article suggests that the contract and partnership analogies, prop-
erly understood, explain persisting puzzles relating to the close corpora-
tion. For example, an understanding of how differences in the extent and
nature of team-specific investment effect the governance needs of jointly
owned firms, suggests that jointly owned firms occupy a spectrum. At
the simpler end are firms that are functionally close to the margin where
organization outside of firm would be equally efficient. At the other,
more complex, end are large, publicly held firms.
This Article suggests that, counter to the assertions of many com-
mentators, there is an identifiable class of jointly owned, closely held
firms-archetypical close corporations-for which unmodified corporate
form is the preferred contractual starting point. This Article also identi-
fies two other classes of corporations-the partnership corporation and
the sole-proprietorship corporation-for which corporation norms would
not be ideal.
The Article also suggests that critics of the contract and partnership
analogies are justified in expecting more from proponents of these analo-
gies. The governance needs of joint owners in closely held firms cannot
be captured in a one sentence analogy or rule of decision. Instead, these
analogies must be applied rigorously, with a much fuller explanation of
the ex ante value effects at stake. The successful development of these
analogies, then, will require that the teachings of transaction cost eco-
nomics and the implications of relational contract theory be more sys-
tematically considered and applied. The theory of rational form
selection and efficiency-minded judging sketched in this Article is but a
small step in that direction.
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